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go into the construction of a democratic regime."4 Variously characterized as middlemen, political activists, or infiuentials, Key . thought the "thin stratum" lying across the structural path between mass opinion and the upper layer of the political elite was critical to the maintenance and persistence of democratic regimes. He argued that these middlemen could constitute a distinctive political subculture sufficiently independent and diverse to provide the pluralism necessary for the democratic formula, sufficiently active and involved to be able to acquire and exploit access to both the narrower circles of political leadership and the wider circles of political participation, and sufficiently imbued with common motives and values as to help maintain and promote a general public trust, a restraint in the exploitation of public opinion, and etiquette in the conduct of opposition politics. Although Key assigned to the middlemen of politics a vital place in democratic regimes, he lamented the fact that little data about them had been assembled by research on the attributes and attitudes of the mass population. Thus, he argued that "systematic knowledge of the composition, distribution in the social structure, and patterns of behavior of this sector of the political system remains far from satisfactory."5 Dwaine Marvick's recent analysis of research on political middlemen, although it indicates that some progress has been made, gives current confirmation to Key's rueful assessment. 6 We have sought, in a particular intra-elite context, to identify at least some important part of the thin stratum of middlemen standing athwart the path between legislators and the mass public, and we will refer to them as attentive constituents. Without presuming that one modest investigation would answer all of Key's implicit and explicit queries about the structure, values, and role of these middlemen, we sought to give form to Key's puzzle by assembling some evidence as to the composition, perspectives, and activities of attentive constituents in one legislative system. Further, we sought to acquire the kind of data that would permit comparisons of these 4V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) ,536-543. The quotations are on 536.
51bid., 537. . 6Dwaine Marvick, "The Middlemen of Politics," in Approaches to the Study of Par-ty Organization, ed. by William J. Crotty (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968) , 341-374. This paper can be consulted for further bibliographical material.
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THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 31 attentive constitl,lents with both legislators and the general adult population. We wanted to be able to characterize these attentive constituents in terms of their socioeconomic status, political awareness, and political activity. We wished to assess their linkage capacity by probing the extent to which they engage in communications above and below them in the political structure. We hoped to examine their role in recruiting members of the top elite. Finally, we wanted to investigate their perspectives on the legislature as an institution, and their support for it. _ It is obvious that dealing with these matters requires a minimum of three discrete sets of survey data-for the mass public, for attentive constituents, and for legislators. Identifying legislators is easy; accordingly, we were able to complete interviews with 181 of the 185 members of the 1967 session of the Iowa legislature. 7 Sampling the adult population of Iowa presented no great difficulty, and in the latter part of 1966 we interviewed 1,001 adult Iowans by way of a random household probability sample. 8 In identifying attentive constituents, we proceeded on the assumption that they should, by and large, be salient to legislators themselves, and thus it should be possible for legislators to identify at least the major attentive constituents in their own districts. 9 Accordingly, when we interviewed Iowa legislators in 1967, we asked them to nominate persons in their own counties whom they regarded as politically knowledgeable and aware, and whose advice they might seek out about legislative issues or problems. From the more than 600 names given us by legislators, we selected and interviewed 484 nominated constituents who matched the communities in which our general population respondents resided. 1o The survey schedule for each set of respondents consisted of a common core of comparable interview items, so 7These interviews, taken in April and May during the legislative session in Des Moines, were conducted by the staff of the Laboratory for Political Research under the direction of Ronald D. Hedlund.
8These interviews occurred in November 1966, and were taken by the field staff of the Iowa Poll under the direction of Director Glenn Roberts. 9Although we were seeking reference individuals for legislators, our research problem bears some resemblances to those encountered in other research on inHuentials. See Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill and Charles Wright, Public Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961 Knowledge about political inHuentials in general naturally leads to the expectation that attentive legislative constituents are composed of persons occupying high status. As Table 1 makes very clear, Iowa's attentive constituents and legislators differed markedly from the general adult population in terms of occupational status and educational attainment. While the proportions of lawyers among attentive constituents and legislators were very similar, a considerably higher percentage of attentive constituents were in professional and managerial occupations and less than half as many were farmers. Attentive constituents also achieved a somewhat higher level of education than legislators.
Legislators, attentive constituents, and the public did not differ greatly in religious affiliation, although Protestants were somewhat over-represented among attentive constituents. Both legislators and attentive constituents differed from the general population in their over-representation of those from thirty-six to sixty-five years of age, and in their under-representation of the younger and very old population. On the average, attentive constituents were their legislators' elders. The comparisons in Table 1 for place of residence present some interesting results which illustrate that among legislators small cities and towns are greatly over-represented vis-a-vis the general public, and Iowans actually living on farms were greatly under-represented. Nearly half of the 1967 legislators resided in cities and towns under 5,000 people, and only two percent actually lived on farms. At the same time, only about a third of the adult citizens of Iowa lived in small cities, and nearly a quarter of them lived on farms. Interestingly for a state ordinarily thought of by outsiders as almost wholly agricultural, though a third of the legislators described themselves as farmers, very few of them in fact resided on farms. They owned, managed, or worked on farms, but most of them lived in small towns and cities. The small-town bias reHected among legislators was not shown among attentive constituents, more of whom actually lived on farms or in the larger cities of the state.
The 484 attentive constituents constituted a comparatively highly politicized middle-elite group. Among attentive constitu-[Vol. 31 ents were a substantial proportion who were occupying, or had occupied, public or political party offices. Beyond that, attentive constituents were highly involved in politics generally, highly aware of legislative affairs, and heavily committed in their political identifications. Their location in the political structure is indicated by the fact that more than two-thirds (64.7 percent) had held, or were holding, some public office. Thirty-one percent had been elected to public office, 16 percent held appointive offices, and another 18 percent had served in both elective and appointive public office. Among those who had held public office a wide variety of offices were represented, although these were almost wholly at the city or county levels. For instance, about a fourth of the attentive constituents (23.1 percent) had served in elected municipal offices, and most of these were city councilmen, mayors, and city attorneys. Another fourth (25.4 percent) had county office experience, as supervisors, county attorneys, or judges. The remainder of those who had served in a public office had been elected to school boards, and a few had served in elected (7.9 percent) or appointed (lO.5 percent) state offices. Of the 484 attentive constituents, only 34 were ex-legislators. While two-thirds of the attentive constituents had public officeholding experience, only about a fourth (25.6 percent) were party leaders in the sense of holding grassroots political party offices. Thus, it seems clear enough that our 484 respondents were attentive constituents from the legislators' perspective very largely because of their places in the governmental structure of the local communities in legislative districts. Although attentive constituents were highly politicized in partisan terms, as we shall show in· a moment, it would appear that linkages between citizens and legislators tend , to occur through local governmental structures more than through political party organizations at the local levels.
Attentive constituents were overwhelmingly more aware of the existence of the day-to-day legislature than the general adult population (See Table 2 ). In the public, very few citizens could respond correctly to the most elementary questions about the legislature, such as how many legislators there were from their county, to which party their legislators belonged, and how often the legislature meets. Although few Iowans knew to which political party their own legislator belonged, two-thirds knew which party controlled [Vol. 31 the legislature as a whole. In contrast, attentive constituents were very substantially capable of correctly answering basic questions about the legislature. Almost all of them knew how often the legislature meets, how long their representatives' terms are, and which party controls each house of the legislature. More than 80 percent knew how many representatives were elected in their county, to which party they belonged, and the terms of state senators. Similarly, attentive constituents are, compared with the general public, overwhelmingly involved in political life and engaged in political activity (See Table 3 ). About one-fifth of all Iowans reported a great deal of interest in politics, and a third said they were very interested in election campaigns. In contrast, 85 percent of the attentive constituents reported high political interest and over 90 percent reported great interest in election campaigns. Similar contrasts can be drawn between the public and attentive constituents in their respective tendencies to follow political developments in the communications media. A third of the general population sample said they talked to people about voting for a party or candidate, while nine-tenths of the attentive constituents reported doing so. activity which they substantiated by wearing a campaign button or putting a campaign sticker on their automobile, while only a fifth of the public reported similar participation. Finally, in contrast to the 70 percent of the general public who reported voting in the mid-term 1966 election, less than one percent of the attentive constituents indicated that they had not voted. Attentive constituents also exhibit marked differences from the general public in their commitment to political parties. Table 4 shows the partisan identifications of legislators, attentive constituents, and public. The distribution for the general public indicates the close parity between Democratic and Republican parties in Iowa in terms of partisan attachments-38 percent identified themselves as Democrats, 39 percent identified themselves as Republicans, and 20 percent were independents. The Republican party is stronger in Iowa from the point of view of relative party identification than in the country as a whole, but Iowa is now clearly a competitive two-party state in terms of the basic partisan commitments of its potential electorate.
The 1967 legislature was much more Republican than was the state as a whole. In 1967, 72 percent of the House seats and 48 percent of the Senate seats were held by Republican legislators. Since [Vol. 31 they were nominated by the legislators themselves, Republicans were over-represented among attentive constituents. In addition, the linkage between legislators and the attentive constituents whom they nominated is very sharp in terms of party identification. Of the attentive constituent nominations made by Democratic legislators, 68 percent were Democrats and 23 percent were Republicans. Of nominations made by Republican legislators, 83 percent were Republicans and only 7 percent were Democrats. So, not only were there more Republican legislators to make nominations of attentive constituents, but Republican legislators were also more likely than Democratic legislators to nominate attentive constituents of their own political party. To consider it from the attentive constituents' viewpoint, 88 percent of the Weak Republican and 92 percent of the Strong Republican constituents were nominated by Republican legislators. Forty-four percent of the Weak Democratic constituents and 77 percent of the Strong Democrats were nominated by Democratic legislators. The extent of inter-party connections is suggested by the fact that a fifth of the Strong Democratic attentives and 56 percent of the Weak Democrats were actmilly nominated by Republican legislators, and that three-fourths of the politically independent attentive constituents were Republican-nominated.
From the standpoint of strength of partisan attachment, legislators and attentive constituents differ sharply from the public as a whole. Seventy-four percent of the legislators and 77 percent of the attentive constituents were strong identifiers, compared with only 40 percent of the general public. In addition, attentive constituents reported much greater consistency of party voting in state legislative elections. Nearly half of the general citizenry (47.9 percent) reported that they had voted for candidates of different parties for state legislative office, while fewer than a fifth of the attentive constituents (19.4 percent) reported similar irregularity.
In their personal and social attributes, attentives in legislative constituencies are much more like the legislators than they are like rank-and-file constituents. They are, to a considerable extent, occupants of important positions in the governmental structures of local communities. They are very knowledgeable about legislative affairs and highly involved in political life. Not only are they powerfully committed to political life generally, but they also exhibit very strong partisan attachments. Politics is much more salient for them than for ordinary citizens, and they are more consistent in their political choices. Many of them have themselves had experience in public office. These are the "folks back home" with whom legislators most regularly maintain contact. These are the leading figures among the middlemen of legislative politics who provide the linkages between the legislator and the mass of his constituents. In terms of communications, what capabilities do these middlemen seem to have for linking mass constituents to their representatives? LINKAGE CAPACITY OF ATTENTIVE CONSTITUENTS Our evidence about the capability of attentive constituents to link legislators and mass constituents together is not as full as we would like, bot the parameters of attentives' linkage capacity are fairly sharply drawn in our data. While we do not have detailed evidence dealing with attentives' contacts with rank-and-file citizens, we do know that 90 percent of the attentive constituents reported talking to citizens about voting for parties or candidates in connection with election campaigns. We think it is fair to assume that most of these contacts were not intramural, and that our attentive constituents were "opinion leaders" in their communities.
But if our data concerning the communications links of attentives with the mass constituencies are not. entirely conclusive, our evidence for their linkages with legislative and other political elites [Vol. 31 is unmistakable. Nearly all of the attentive constituents talked about public or governmental problems with national, state, or local public officials, and 85 percent reported doing so often (see Table  5 ). Similar proportions of the attentive constituents reported talking to state legislators from their districts. These middlemen were in almost constant touch with their state legislators, and more were in contact with state legislators than with any other public leaders. But their communications net was cast well beyond members of the legislature; 56 percent of the attentive constituents reported talking about public problems regularly with national political leaders, and 42 percent reported regular discussions with county and city officials. Forty-three percent of the attentive constituents talked frequently to members of Congress. It seems likely from this fact that many of our 484 attentives served in overlapping middlemen roles and constituted part of the attentive, active, and responsive public for several constituencies.n The contacts these middlemen maintained at the state and national levels of government were almost wholly legislative in character. Very few reported talking regularly to national or state administrative officials (only 4.5 percent in the case of the national level, and 14.5 percent at the state level). The attentive constituent not only talks with his legislators a great deal, he also reports substantial attempts to influence them as well. In contrast to the rank-and-file citizen who rarely reported attempts to influence legislative decisions, attentives by very wide margins reported having done so. As Table 6 indicates, 71 percent of the public-sample respondents said they never had done anything to try to influence a decision by the legislature, while only 4 percent of the attentive constituents reported such restraint. When reference is made specifically to changing legislative enactments that they might consider harmful or unjust, almost all attentive con- stituents indicated the likelihood that they would actually try to do something, while 40 percent of the general public sample considered it unlikely that they would do anything. Finally, attentive constituents perceived a fairly strong likelihood that they would be successful in changing a state law they considered unjust or harmful. Eighty-one percent thought they would have some chance of success, whereas nearly two-thirds of the rank-and-file citizens took a dim view of their influence in such an effort.
We asked attentive constituents what they talked to state legislators about. Some reported talking about local governmental affairs, but the overwhelming numbers discussed state-wide policy issues. More talked about state financial problems and education than about other issues. Fifty-nine percent said they discussed budgetary and tax problems with their legislators, and among them the most prominent issue was that of property-tax relief. Eightyseven percent reported talking about other legislative policy issues, the most consequent being that of education (26.0 percent). Notably missing from the reported content of discussion between attentive constituents and legislators is strictly political content-patronage, personnel, reelection problems, party-organizational issues, or political strategy. If issue considerations are of minimal consequence in the mass public, they clearly dominate discussions between attentive constituents and legislators." 2 Our data make it plain that the communications channels are open very wide and that they are substantially filled with discussions of policy questions.
Attentive constituents have a remarkable capacity for linking mass citizen and legislator. Most of them talk politics regularly with others. Many report persistent discussion with county, city, and other local public officials. These attentives are in very heavy contact with legislators, they attempt to influence, and they have a high sense of efficacy about their attempts. In this interaction between legislators and attentive constituents the public policy content of the political process becomes prominent. But in addition to finding attentive constituents suffused in the heavy atmosphere of policy-issue politics, we expected them to play an active part in the recruitment of legislators. 
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RECRUITMENT CAPABILITY OF ATTENTIVE CONSTITUENTS
The commitment of attentive constituents to legislative politics is clearly revealed in their considerable role in the recruitment process. Undoubtedly many of them are part of the recruitment pool for higher public office, in light of the fact that more than two-thirds of them have had experience in public office. But beyond that, the attentive constituents served as middlemen in the recruitment of other candidates for political office.
We asked attentives whether any candidates talked to them about running for office before they announced their candidacies, and whether the attentives had ever suggested to someone that he ought to run for public office. Attentive constituents were able to estimate the number of times they had entered the recruitment process in these ways, and these estimates of their recruitment contacts are shown in Table 7 . Only 15 percent said that no candidate for office had ever discussed running for office prior to his announcement, and only a fifth said they never had suggested to someone that he be a candidate. For 55 percent of the attentives, prior discussion of candidacy for public office was a fairly frequent occurrence, and 41 percent said that they had frequently suggested to people that they run for office. In a political system where selfstarted political careers are not unusual, the extent to which these attentive constituents are involved in recruiting candidates for office appears to be reasonably heavyY While attentive constituents were involved in the recruitment of national, state, and local officials, their recruitment role was focused on legislative office and, in particular, on the state legislature. Table  8 shows that about a third of the attentives received candidacy contacts from prospective members of Congress, and slightly more than a fifth suggested candidacies for Congress. A higher proportion (49.0 percent and 47.3 percent respectively) of these attentive constituents were involved in the recruitment of candidates for county and city offices, spread rather widely across the variety of such offices available. But it is at the level of state offices that the recruitment role of attentive constituents is most pronounced. Threefourths of the attentives reported that candidates for state offices discussed their candidacies with them, and two-thirds suggested candidates for state offices. Of these, the overwhelming proportion were candidacies for the state legislature. Forty-two percent of the attentives said that candidates for the state House of Representatives discussed their candidacies with them prior to announcing, and 18 percent stated that senatorial candidates had prior discussions with them. Again, 35 percent of the attentives reported that they had suggested candidacies to prospective senators. These data underscore the proximity of the linkage between attentjve constituents and legislators in political terms. They indicate not only that attentive constituents are very much in communication with legislators and are communicating to a substantial degree in policy terms, but also that they are, to a considerable extent, recruitment influentials as well. We cannot know to what degree the recruitment efforts of the attentive constituents were successful in terms of actual legislative candidacies, but it is plain enough that many attentives conceived of themselves as important actors in the legislative recruitment process. Given the scope and character of the linkage that attentive constituents provide between the mass public and the legislative elite, we would anticipate that attentives' perspectives on the institutional role of the legislature would differ from those of the general population. We certainly expected that a higher proportion of attentive constituents would be able to describe the functions of the legislature, and that their perspectives on the legislative institution would be more sophisticated than would be true of the public-at-[Vol. 31 large. We were not at all sure what particular differences between attentives and public would emerge.
We asked both groups, "How would you describe the job of the state legislature, that is, what are the things that it ought to do when it meets in Des Moines?" From a wide variety of concrete responses, it was possible to characterize respondents' perspectives under four major substantive rubrics. The first of these was the procedural perspective. Those whose perspective was procedural viewed the legislature primarily as a law-making machine; their focus was upon the legislative organization and procedures that produce laws. The second category was the representative perspective. Many respondents could view the legislature in terms of the representative role of the legislators, or the representativeness of the legislature as a whole. A third perspective was the purposive orientation to the legislature. Those who took a purposive perspective expressed general norms about how the legislature should operate-that the legislature should take care of pressing problems, that they should "give bills a good going over," that they should work hard and accomplish something. Finally, many respondents viewed the legislature from a policy-oriented perspective. They saw the legislature as an arena in which issues were resolved, programs developed, and policies adopted. They talked about the legislature in terms of making policy changes, raising taxes, providing welfare programs, providing for schools, providing more roads, and regulating traffic. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive categories; the real-world legislature may be thought of as being characterized by all of these attributes. Many respondents were able to conceive of the legislature as a multi-faceted institution. Table 9 shows the compariso·n of attentive constituents and public in their conceptions of the role of the legislature under these rubrics. A third of the general population sample could not find a way to describe the job of the legislature, whereas almost all of the attentive constituents could do so. The greater legislative sophistication of attentive constituents is underscored by the fact that their mean number of responses was 2.14, while the average number of responses for the general public was only 1.14. We are impressed by the considerable proportion of respondents in the general population sample who could characterize the legislature in policy-oriented terms (34.6 percent), but as we suspected a substantially higher percentage of attentive constituents viewed the legislature in these terms (48.1 percent). Comparatively speaking, the representative and purposive aspects of the legislative institution were only dimly seen by the general public, while attentive constituents were able to conceive of the legislature in more sophisticated, more abstract, and more varied ways. We suggest that this means, in line with conventional expectations, that attentive constituents have a more complete and realistic conception of what the legislature is than do people in the general population.
ATTENTIVE CONSTITUENTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE LEGISLATURE
Attentive constituents are more like legislators than they are like the mass public, they are knowledgeable and highly involved politically, they have a high capacity for providing communication linkages between public and legislators, they are substantially involved in recruiting legislators, and they exhibit, when compared with the mass public, highly sophisticated conceptions of the role of the legislative institution in the political system. Because of their strategic position in the legislative system, we would expect them to play a crucial part in the support structure of the legislature. If, as it seems probable, demands in the legislative system are very likely to be crystallized and communicated through attentive constituents, then we would expect the attentives to interject high levels of support into the system as well.
One way to think about support for the legislature is to evaluate [Vol. 31 the performance of a particular legislative session. In our interviews with attentive constituents and the general population sample, we asked, "In general, would you say that the Iowa state legislature does an excellent job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?" Attentive constituents were interviewed some six months after the interviews with respondents in the population sample. The legislative session that was immediately past for the public sample would have been the session in 1965, while attentive constituents were interviewed just after the 1967 session of the legislature. Both sessions were atypical in certain respects. In both, there was a very high turnover of legislators, especially in the House of Representatives. The Democrats controlled both Senates, but the Democrats had a majority in the 1965 House and the Republicans a majority in the 1967 House. The same governor, Harold E. Hughes, was in office for both sessions. Both legislatures were reasonably well-apportioned, and, by Iowa standards, both enacted unusually progressive legislation. Still, we cannot know to what extent these two sessions of the legislature constituted different referents for attentive constituents and the general public. We have no way of overcoming the time and referential differences that may be involved here. This caveat notwithstanding, the evaluations of attentive constituents and public are interesting (they are shown in Table 10 ). In their e~aluations of the legislature, the two groups did not differ greatly. A higher proportion of attentive constituents (57.6 percent) rated the legislature as having done a good or excellent job than did respondents in the public (51.0 percent), but more public respondents gave the legislature only fair (38.4 percent), and more attentive constituents rated the legislature as poor (8.3 percent). If we score the ratings on a 4 to 1 scale, giving excellent a 4 and poor a 1, the mean rating of attentive constituents was somewhat higher than for the public (2.52 as against 2.38). We incline to the view that attentive constituents were about as critical of the legislature as the public generally, although perhaps for different reasons. But evaluation of the performance of a particular legislative session is, in a sense, ephemeral and evanescent. We certainly can imagine a citizen thinking that the last legislature did a very poor job and still strongly supporting the legislature as a symbol, as an institution, as a process. We wanted to probe beneath mere performance rating to measure support for the legislative institution. I4 Accordingly, we asked our three sets of respondents a set of seven questions designed to measure diffuse legislative support. The questions, calling for Likert-type agree-disagree responses, were these:
( 1) There are times when it almost seems better for the citizens of the state to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the state legislature to act.
(2) If you don't particularly agree with a state law, it is all right to break it if you are careful not to get caught.
( 3) There are times when it would almost seem better for the Governor to take the law into his own hands rather than wait for the legislature to act.
( 4) Even though one might strongly disagree with a state law, after it has been passed by the state legislature one ought to obey it.
( 5) One should be willing to do everything that one could to make sure that any proposal to abolish the state legislature was defeated.
( 6) If the Iowa legislature continually passed laws that the people disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the legislature altogether. [Vol. 31 (7) It would not make much difference if the constitution of Iowa was rewritten to reduce the powers of the state legislature.
Responses to these seven items for all three groups of respondents together were factor analyzed, and respondents were factor scored across all seven items. In the process, we lost 51 general population respondents because of the incidence of "don't know" responses, so our base number for this group is 950 in this analysis. We divided the legislative support scores into three groups, labeling them "High," "Medium," and "Low," roughly by terciles. 15 The appropriate comparisons are shown in Table 11 . The data provided dra- matic evidence of the ladder structure of support for the legislative institution. In the general population, support was relatively low; 52 percent of the public sample fell roughly into the lower third of the support scores. The word relatively should be underlined here because actually the level of public support for the legislature was quite high. Instead of low, medium, and high; it might be better to read the support levels in Table 11 as high, higher, and highest. But 15Respondents were factor-scored from the first factor of a principal component analysis. Then mean factor scores were computed, and respondents were categorized in tem1S of deviations from the mean. The "High" category consisted of those whose support scores were one-half a standard deviation above the mean; the "Low" category included those whose scores were onehalf a standard deviation below the mean; and, the "Medium" group included those whose scores were between one-half a standard deviation above and onehalf a standard deviation below the mean. The "High," "Medium," and "Low" groups were very nearly equal in size. the level of support in an absolute sense is not at issue here; we are interested in comparing public, attentive constituents, and legislators. In that comparison, attentive constituents were vastly more supportive of the legislature as an institution than was the general public. Half the attentives were in the highest third of the support scores. Finally, legislators themselves were the most supportive of the legislature; two-thirds of them were in the high category. Diffuse support for the legislative institution was skewed in the supportive direction by the very high support inputs from the middlemen who provide a vital linkage between legislative elites and the mass public.
CONCLUSION
We have sketched the profile of the middlemen in legislative politics as sharply and fully as we can. We have suggested the critical role in the legislative system we think attentive constituents exert. Our data contribute to V. O. Key's hope for new knowledge about the form and structure of the middlemen in politics. We have shown, as Key asked to be shown, that attentive constituents are a socially diverse group, although strongly biased toward the upper socioeconomic end of the scale. We have shown that the political middlemen are highly aware and active politically, that they have access to wide circles of political leadership, and that they are heavily committed to involvement in the recruitment of the top echelon of leaders. Finally, we have shown that attentive constituents provide a powerful input of loyalty to, or support for, the legislative institution.
Key hoped, further, for evidence that the middlemen of politics constituted a special subculture, highly imbued with democratic values yet sufficiently incohesive so that alternatives would be available among competing elites. Attentive constituents do share subculture values about the virtue of the legislative way of life, but they are sharply divided in their political loyalties. In future reports we hope to show the content and structure of other kinds of value sharing among attentive constituents, and to probe more deeply into the cross-cutting effects of party differences in the linkage role of political middlemen.
